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THE NEED FOR CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 
Joseph Owens 
With its probative force drawn solely from premises accessible to the human 
mind's own inherent powers, Christian philosophy probes the divinely re-
vealed truths under their naturally knowable aspects. From the apologetic or 
defensive angle, this type of philosophy is needed to meet rational queries-
one's own or those of others-arising from religious doctrines, for instance 
from the tenets of creation, divine providence, immortality of the spiritual 
soul, or human destiny. On the positive side, Christian philosophy deepens 
the attraction of revealed doctrines in a way comparable to the enhancement 
given them by architecture, music, art and poetry in actual Christian life. 
I 
The expression "Christian philosophy" may seem at first hearing to be a 
straightforward phrase, quite as "Canadian philosophy" or "American phi-
losophy." It has, however, been given widely differing interpretations in the 
course of its history down the centuries of the Christian era.! In modern times 
it has evoked conflicting and even contradictory responses from writers who 
have had occasion to examine closely its import and its field of reference. A 
brief preliminary overview of modern reactions to the notion is accordingly 
in order for any contemporary approach to the question of its need. Naturally 
there would not be much point in asking about the need for Christian phi-
losophy today if one is not first satisfied that this type of philosophy has at 
least the status of something possible. 
On the one hand, for a number of capable modern philosophers and histo-
rians the expression "Christian philosophy" has been a blatant contradiction 
in terms. It has seemed like a square circle. In the present century it was 
compared by the German philosopher Heidegger to the notion of "iron 
wood."2 Something that has the nature of iron obviously cannot be wood, and 
something that has the nature of wood cannot be iron any more than a square 
can be circular. For those writers, a teaching that is characteristically Chris-
tian is something that is accepted on the authority of Christian revelation. It 
is not something that can be reasoned to on the philosophical plane. In 
contrast, a philosophical tenet is something developed by human reason 
alone, apart from any revelation through religious channels. "Christian," for 
them, will involve belief in something on the basis of divine authority, while 
philosophy eschews any such dependence on a religious source. The case has 
been regarded by those thinkers as solidly grounded and airtight, and accord-
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ingly as closed. What is philosophical is understood, in the light of unaided 
human reason, while something specifically Christian is not understood but 
is believed on the strength of its religious source. The religious source is not 
something in the purely rational order. Stated bluntly and succinctly, that is 
one side of the issue at stake. The stand is definite. 
On the other hand, "Christian philosophy" is a notion that has been in use 
from quite early times in our era, and today it has received greater prominence 
than ever before.3 It is a conception that persists, in spite of all attacks upon 
it. In its earliest use it stood for the way of thinking that in Christian life 
assumed the prestige held by philosophy in the ancient Greek world. It was 
what provided an account of the universe as a whole, culminating in the 
problems of human destiny. So for Augustine all Greek philosophy had 
reached its apex in Plotinus and now melded with Christian doctrine in giving 
an overall view of human life.4 This was what Augustine himself termed 
"Christian philosophy." It was "our philosophy," as it had been called in 
earlier Christian circles. It had quite the same bearing as what one means 
today in speaking of a general philosophy of life. It was not restricted to 
today's narrower significance of a special branch in academic studies. 
With this concept of Christian philosophy, as it is first found in patristic 
writings, there can hardly be any quarrel from today's perspectives. But in 
medieval times "philosophy" became sharply distinguished from sacred the-
ology. Philosophy for the medievals was based on naturally evident principles 
only, while theology proceeded from divinely revealed truths. The distinction 
between the two was clear-cut and decisive. The pagan writers were regarded 
by the thinkers of the middle ages as the "philosophers." In contrast, the 
Christian writers were the "theologians."3 But those theologians in their work 
made copious use of the philosophers. Against that background a present-cen-
tury historian of medieval philosophy, Etienne Gilson, found a number of 
"Christian philosophies" within the theological writings of the middle ages. 
Gilson published books with titles such as The Christian Philosophy of Saint 
Augustine,6 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,' The Christian 
Philosophy of the Middle Ages,8 and a general introduction under the caption 
Introduction a la philosophie chretienne.9 Used in this direct contrast to 
Christian theology, the expression "Christian philosophy" has now become a 
commonly accepted phrase, regardless of disagreement about its meaning or 
its possibility. 
Long before Gilson's time, in fact, the academic distinction between phi-
losophy and sacred theology had become solidly established in university 
circles, especially in Scholastic writings and in the German school tradition. 
The basic division of the one type of study from the other seemed sufficiently 
obvious. The two were accordingly regarded as radically different disciplines. 
Philosophy grounded its reasoning on naturally acceptable starting points. It 
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could not make use of revealed truth as premises for its demonstrations. In 
consequence it could not permit itself to be specified by anything that was 
given through divine revelation. In this traditional setting no philosophy 
seemed amenable to designation by the notion "Christian," as many modem 
writers viewed the situation. Hence arose the stand that there can no more be 
a Christian philosophy than there could be a Christian mathematics or a 
Christian chemistry. 
In Gilson's day this objection was expressly raised against the very notion 
of "Christian philosophy" by another prominent French historian of philoso-
phy and expert in medieval writings, Emile Brehier. A formal debate between 
the two conflicting views on the topic was arranged in the early thirties of 
the present century. In it the issues were clearly drawn up. to Both sides agreed 
from the start that as a philosophy a Christian philosophy had to be account-
able solely to the tribunal of unaided human reason. It could not appeal to 
religious sources for support. That condition was accepted unhesitatingly by 
both sides in the debate. It focused the problem precisely on the question how 
Christianity could specify a discipline without entering intrinsically into its 
reasoning processes. 
To Cartesian or Enlightenment philosophers, this objection necessarily pre-
sented a veritable impasse. Where the structure of philosophy was conceived 
on the model of a mathematical or experimental science, value free and 
mathematically controllable, the motivation or religious conditioning of its 
practitioner could not legitimately affect its specification. No matter what the 
personal motivation of a mathematician or a physicist may be it does not 
serve to characterize his science as specifically Christian, in the Enlightenment 
view of the notion "science." That is why there cannot be such a thing as a 
Christian mathematics or a Christian chemistry, according to these thinkers. 
But we are no longer in the Enlightenment era. In philosophy today, as 
understood in the present postmodern and hermeneutic age, the intrinsic 
character of one's philosophy varies according to one's linguistic and cultural 
upbringing, and in a person's cultural upbringing a decisive role may be 
played by the individual religious conditioning and background. In conse-
quence, a philosopher whose motivation and training are Christian can well 
be drawn to special problems of personal concern. She or he may readily look 
for naturally knowable starting points on the philosophic level that are dif-
ferent from those that would attract a non-Christian. The same holds propor-
tionally, of course, for thinkers brought up in Islamic or Jewish or any other 
culture. 
In accord with this wide possibility of choice, a selection is in fact made 
by each individual thinker from among the indefinitely numerous groupings 
of naturally knowable starting points for philosophical reasoning. The selec-
tion of this group of philosophical principles may well be dependent on the 
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person's religious habituation. It can be made freely in line with that moti-
vation. The result is that on such a basis an entire philosophy may be specified 
as Christian, even though nothing specifically Christian enters into its rea-
soning processes. This means that a person can pursue philosophy for the 
purpose of aiding her or his religious faith. Because of the direction given 
by the extrinsic yet presupposed personal upbringing, the philosophical think-
ing becomes a specifically distinct type of philosophy from that of non-Chris-
tian thinkers. As with Aristotle,l1 a pre-philosophical dialectic serves as the 
path leading up to the principles from which the properly philosophic rea-
soning commences. But the path itself remains extrinsic to the strictly philo-
sophical discourse. 
In a word, there is ample ground today for justifying the notion of Christian 
philosophy, especially if one is following in some way the current hermeneu-
tical conception of what philosophy is. In this regard one has to show that 
Christian interests do in fact furnish the motivation for distinctive Christian 
philosophy that will elucidate revealed tenets, but will not infringe in any 
way upon the domain of sacred theology by introducing dependence on re-
vealed premises. With this more technical formulation of what Christian 
philosophy envisages, one is in a position to approach the question whether 
or not there is any need for it in today's intellectual world. 
II 
Perhaps the best approach to the present question will consist in a glance at 
a few particular Christian beliefs taken one by one. Each may be examined 
in itself to see if it has any need of philosophical understanding in order to 
play its role more effectively in Christian life and in its relations to philo-
sophical concerns. The procedure of first considering these tenets individu-
ally seems indicated by the lack of any immediately obvious reason why the 
notion of Christianity in general should require philosophical support. Chris-
tianity had in fact no express mandate from its founder to engage in philo-
sophical activity. Thousands upon thousands of people have led good 
Christian lives without any immediate help from absorption in philosophy 
courses. Most Christians, perhaps, have little if any inkling of what academic 
philosophy means. The issue, accordingly, is best approached not from the 
notion of Christianity in general but rather from the consideration of particu-
lar Christian beliefs taken each in itself. The individual tenet may be asked 
if philosophical elucidation will help it play the part meant for it in religious 
practice and in the problems to which it gives rise when it is confronted with 
philosophical issues. 
As a first instance, one might look at the initial article of the Nicene Creed. 
That basic truth of Christian belief readily presents aspects that repay careful 
philosophical consideration without at all infringing upon the mystery in-
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volved in this revelation. The article is formulated as "I believe in God, the 
Father almighty, the maker of heaven and earth."12 Correspondingly, the open-
ing words of the first book in the Bible are "In the beginning God created 
heaven and earth." Here the notion of "making" is familiar enough to natural 
reason. It means bringing a new thing into being through transforming some 
material into an object different from what it was, as wood for instance is 
made into a table or bread is made from flour. But there are difficulties here. 
When the totality of the finite things in heaven and earth is under question, 
there is no room for any other finite material out of which they could be 
made. This notion of creatio ex nihilo, that is, of making something out of 
nothing calls accordingly for philosophical elucidation to show that one is 
not conceiving nothingness as a sort of material out of which the world would 
be educed. Rather, one should mean that nothing else was already in existence 
out of which the things could be made. The notion of creation has to be 
explained as the imparting of existence without anything whatever to work 
upon. 
To the inquiring mind this consideration poses a number of questions that 
call for philosophical answers. A Christian can of course through the gift of 
faith firmly believe what stands written in the Bible or is stated in the creed. 
Yet in actual life one has to face one's own questions and also those of the 
people with whom one associates. Our mind is naturally inquisitive. It is 
thrown at once upon the defensive at the objection that "making" should 
require a material out of which something new is made. Here the proper 
procedure for human knowledge, one may urge, should be to accept the 
supposition that something always was there. One then could theorize about 
the "big bang" starting the process that has resulted in the extremely compli-
cated universe we know today. Or, with the medievals, one could argue about 
the concept of creation from all eternity. But the making of something without 
any preexisting material, as required by the Christian tenet, seems to defy 
human comprehension. Ground is offered for the temptation to say that the 
very notion is too farfetched to merit any serious consideration. There are 
better things to do than to waste time thinking about it. Here the banner of 
ridicule is easy to flaunt. Christian faith does indeed require belief in mys-
teries that readily provide ground for caricature, and the step from the sublime 
to the ridiculous can be made to look very short. 
Accordingly Christian writers from very early times became engaged in 
defensive procedures against such objections to their beliefs. Highly devel-
oped Greek philosophy was vigorous and active in the patristic era. In face 
of it Christian defenders, or "apologists" as they were called in the Greek 
parlance of the day, soon developed the technique of drawing upon philoso-
phy itself to meet philosophical objections. This technique has been described 
as their using Goliath's own sword to cut off Goliath's head.13 
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The technique, in point of fact, proved effective up to the point for which 
it was required. It would not convince anyone already persuaded of the 
opposite. But at least it gave oneself, and proclaimed before the public, the 
quietude and assurance that one was not flying in the face of human reason 
when adhering to Christian beliefs. It used philosophical weapons to decapi-
tate philosophical objections of one's own or those of others, even though by 
itself it could not bring about religious conversion. 
This apologetic or defensive need for philosophy can be seen persisting 
down the centuries, through medieval into modern times. One may be startled 
at first by new attacks upon Christian faith. But if one has sufficient philo-
sophical knowledge to see the foundations upon which the structure of the 
objections is raised, one is not disturbed. One is able to see how one's own 
philosophical thinking is not at all affected by the opposed conclusions. They 
are conclusions that may proceed cogently on the basis of other philosophies, 
but not at all from one's own starting points. Accordingly one's own religious 
beliefs remain untroubled by the objections or the caricature. The other per-
son's stand likewise stays unaffected. There is no conversion, as long as each 
adheres to the starting points already adopted. But one has shown convinc-
ingly that one's own religious belief can stand up just as strongly as ever in 
the pluralistic ambient of philosophy today. That is all that is required when 
the situation is viewed from the defensive or apologetic angle. Here Christian 
philosophy has been notably rewarding and satisfying. Surely it fills a need. 
Hence in regard to the present example, namely the belief that God made 
the heavens and the earth, the belief mentioned first in Bible and creed, one 
can smooth out the notion of "making" in a way that allows room for the 
Christian belief in creation out of nothing. "Making," or in traditional philo-
sophical terminology "efficient causality," can be explained as the giving of 
existence to something else, rather than in the older Greek conception of 
starting motion in something already existent. The things we experience 
around us receive and lose existence. The existence cannot be explained just 
by the thing's nature. The nature of a tree just as a tree, for instance, does 
not mean that the tree actually exists. Its present existence, rather, does not 
come from itself but from something else. The process is traced back to 
existence that subsists of itself, and the existence so reached is God as philo-
sophically conceived. In this perspective "making" is elucidated as the im-
parting of existence, whether or not some material is already there. The notion 
of "making" is accordingly freed from necessary dependence upon a material 
out of which the thing is made. The Christian belief that God created all 
existents other than himself is thereby secured from the philosophical attack 
that a preexistent material is required. "Making" is shown to mean the im-
parting of existence, whether or not a preexisting material is there to receive 
the actuation. 
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One may, of course, insist that this manner of reaching God from the 
existence of sensible things through rational discourse is the procedure of a 
particular type of philosophy, a type of existential thinking that is far from 
enjoying general acceptance in the philosophical world of today or of any 
other epoch. That observation is true. But need it be surprising in the current 
hermeneutical conception of the nature of philosophy? The starting points of 
philosophies vary indefinitely, and the whole of each properly reasoned phi-
losophy follows consistently in the wake of the respective starting points. 
Hence the well-known observation that philosophers never agree among 
themselves. 14 Accordingly we have our present-day genial pluralism in the 
philosophical world. 
What is at issue here is to understand the rationale of this pluralism. The 
starting points need to be carefully selected. Then the rest of your philosophy 
follows cogently in their wake, if you are thinking consistently. IS Even the 
philosophies of other thinkers will become interpreted in the light of one's 
own principles. Aquinas, for instance, could take Aristotle's reasoning to 
divine existence, from actuality and potentiality, and make it prove something 
that Aristotle never intended. With existence recognized as the dominant and 
immediately known actuality in sensible things, the structure of the Aristote-
lian reasoning is seen to culminate for Aquinas in a unique and infinite God, 
instead of in the finite separate substances of the Stagirite. Likewise Aquinas 
takes the arguments of other thinkers besides Aristotle and interprets them in 
the light of his own starting points, reaching cogently his own characteristic 
conclusions. The point here is that one's personal philosophic starting points 
determine the way one interprets a philosophical demonstration. 
What is required for the apologetic or defensive purposes, then, is to un-
derstand the way philosophies work. The hermeneutic understanding of the 
nature of philosophy decapitates the objection that one is merely using one's 
own personal starting points, instead of submitting to an alleged agreement 
among philosophers after the fashion expected for an Enlightenment science. 
It meets the objection in a thoroughly philosophical way, namely by a philo-
sophical manifestation of the nature of philosophy itself. It is using Goliath's 
sword in precisely that manner. Where the existential actuality of sensible 
things is seen as the basic determination in the starting points, its influence 
will be all-pervasive and decisive. Only by the use of radically different 
starting points will the allegedly insuperable difficulties arise. 
A materialistic philosophy, for instance, starts from the tenet that whatever 
can be known has length, breadth and thickness. From that starting point there 
is no way of reaching anything immaterial, such as the spiritual soul or an 
existence that subsists just in itself. That type of starting point can hardly 
hope to ground a demonstration that God exists, as God is believed in by a 
Christian. The Christian philosopher understands this, and thereby sees that 
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the arguments of his opponent do not affect his own philosophical reasoning 
to the existence of God. Likewise, the Kantian objection that the categories 
of theoretical reasoning are meant to apply only to the sensible world and 
have no validity outside what is sensible, does not at all touch a philosophy 
that reasons from starting points of a different type. But in all cases like this, 
the Christian thinker needs to understand the nature of philosophy itself, and 
keep aware of how it works. Philosophy itself is what gives reassurance here. 
Accordingly there is definite need for a philosophy that is Christian. That 
philosophy does not convert anybody, nor is it intended to do so. But it is 
immensely reassuring. It enables one to remain steadfast in upholding the 
inherent dignity of human intelligence while accepting mysteries on religious 
faith. It is Goliath's own sword, namely philosophy, that is used by the 
Christian thinker to sever the head of the attacker by making manifest the 
nature of the starting points or principles upon which the assault was based. 
These considerations, then, illustrate vividly the defensive or apologetic 
side of Christian philosophy in the demonstration of the existence of God as 
maker of the universe. Christian philosophy, precisely as such, is not meant 
to convert anybody to belief in the Christian God. That is a prerogative of 
divine grace. It is in no way a task for philosophy. But the situation does 
establish an important role for philosophy in Christian life. All in all, a 
Christian philosophy is from this angle a veritable need. It is a solid defense 
of Christian belief on the intellectual level. 
This defensive or apologetic side of Christian philosophy may at first 
hearing have a decidedly negative ring. But even in the demonstration of 
God's existence it resounds with positive appeal, and amply so. In under-
standing existence as the very nature of God, philosophy offers a penetrating 
overture into a fuller grasp of the status of all perfections in God. Without 
existence there cannot be the least actuality or perfection. There would be 
just nothing. In the other extreme, where existence subsists, as it does in God, 
it involves all perfections. Hence anything at all positive that we can imagine 
or think of, has to be found in its primary existence in God. Once existence 
has been shown with Aquinas to be "the actuality of all actualities" and "the 
perfection of all perfections,"l6 God is seen to be endowed by his very nature 
with all positive attributes in an infinitely high degree. That includes the 
attribute of power, power that in subsistent existence is not hemmed in by 
any finite nature, a nature that would inevitably limit its extent. Thereby God 
is shown to be omnipotent in the way required by the notion of creation ex 
nihilo, insofar as the divine ability to "make" is not limited by any demand 
for a material upon which to act. Similarly God's concurrence in the act of 
human free will in creatures does not infringe upon human or angelic liberty. 
This gives philosophical basis for the rhetorical question in the Scriptures 
" ... what achievement of ours but the doing of it is thine?"l7 
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These very positive aspects can be elucidated in the pursuit of Christian 
philosophy. The process gives tremendous satisfaction to the inquiring human 
intellect. It is at every step a means of solidity and sustenance in one's 
religious practice. It provides a rational framework for the deepening and 
development of one's spirituality. Surely just as the arts of poetry, music, 
painting and architecture can give very positive elevation to religious life 
without detriment to their nature as arts, so this positive function of Christian 
philosophy may be regarded as a need for Christian life in overall fashion. 
Though developed professionally in academic minds, it is able to simmer 
down to the general Christian public through popular preaching and literature 
and art. 
In itself, however, none of the philosophical reasoning about the first article 
of the Christian creed reaches to the notion of God as a father. One of the 
criticisms leveled against the Greek philosopher Aristotle is that his concep-
tion of God as the prime mover of the universe is too cold a notion to be 
applied to the God of Christian revelation. It has been regarded as incongru-
ous in a Christian context. But this objection bears on something beyond the 
philosophical demonstration's scope. Philosophical reasoning is not at all 
capable of reaching the notion of God as father, either within the divine 
Trinity or in the adoption of human beings through grace as God's children. 
Those are truths left for supernatural revelation. The fatherhood of God in 
both respects remains a mystery of faith. Yet as creator of the visible universe 
God can be known by philosophical reasoning, and the infinite existence that 
is so known remains open to whatever further aspects faith may add to it. 
There is, moreover, nothing necessarily cold about the philosophical notion 
of subsistent existence. Subsistent existence opens out to the inclusion of 
every perfection or intelligible attraction that may be brought into our aware-
ness through means beyond philosophical discovery. Philosophy shows that 
subsistent existence, because infinite, far surpasses the power of the human 
mind to comprehend. Philosophy thereby solidly establishes the conclusion 
that there can be more things in heaven and earth than can be dreamt of. In 
regard to the divine nature, philosophy cannot bring forward any cogent 
reason why an infinitely perfect nature could not be internally related to itself 
in three different ways in the persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Phi-
losophy has no means for making these internal relations manifest. But by 
the same token it cannot bring out any demonstrative reason against the 
revealed tenet. It accordingly offers no valid ground for disbelief. The fini-
tude of the human mind cannot, even by definition, hope to penetrate the 
fullness of an infinite first cause. That is why human reason cannot under-
stand or explain or do away with the mystery of the blessed Trinity. 
In a word, a philosophic consideration of the first article of the creed aptly 
illustrates the helpful role of Christian philosophy. It offers intellectual un-
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derpinning to an article of Christian faith defensively or apologetically. From 
that angle it offers deep intellectual attraction to the inquiring mind. By 
distinguishing the naturally knowable aspects from those that are attainable 
only through revelation it makes clear the extent to which human reason can 
uphold or attack the revealed doctrine. In this way philosophy provides 
deeply appreciated satisfaction for a groping human intellect, and meets in 
welcome fashion a veritable human need. In so doing, moreover, it presents 
Christian truth with a depth and appeal fully comparable to the enhancement 
given to the riches of religious faith by poetry, music, architecture and art. 
III 
A second instance that illustrates the need for Christian philosophy may be 
found in the problems about the immortality of the human soul. Quite gen-
erally people feel that somehow their loved ones live on in one way or another 
after bodily death. Grave or crematory is hard to accept as absolutely the end. 
Christian belief, moreover, has consistently upheld the soul's immortality. 
But rational proof of survival after bodily death turns out to be difficult, and 
therefore, perhaps, unwelcome as a topic for ordinary discourse. In a short 
manuscript setting forth personal beliefs, Lord Byng of Vimy is said to have 
communicated to Georges Vanier, who was later to be one of his successors 
as Governor General of Canada, his own attitude towards immortality. Byng 
claimed to believe in immortality as implicitly as anyone does. But he was 
glad that nobody had ever been able to prove it to him, in spite of numerous 
efforts. IS Quite obviously, Christian philosophy may see here a challenge to 
probe the reasons for this attitude. 
Pagan philosophy was able to show that the range of the human mind's 
thinking surpasses the limits of the merely material order.19 Our thinking 
obviously transcends the here and now. We can think in terms of infinite 
extension and infinite time. That is enough to show that in its nature the 
human soul has capacities that reach beyond material limitations, and that it 
accordingly specifies an existence that does not depend upon a body even 
though matter is a specifying principle of its nature. This grounds the con-
clusion that the human soul is naturally indestructible, since its existence does 
not depend upon bodily parts that can be dissolved in death. So once the 
human soul is endowed with existence it naturally has that existence forever. 
Within its own nature there is no material factor that would permit its de-
struction. 
But the topic has its difficulties. In dramatically recounting Socrates' last 
discourse in the prison cell before the drinking of the lethal hemlock, Plato 
described how the audience was overwhelmed by the sublimity of the topic, 
yet did not find the argument convincing.20 The difficulty was attributed to 
the greatness of the subject and the weakness of human intelligence. Our own 
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reaction today may not be much different. Philosophical arguments for the 
soul's survival may appear enticing, but they do not seem to click with 
cogency. For Plato, the soul unlike material things was the cause of its own 
motion. It was defined as a self-movent. It was not dependent upon anything 
else for its motion, and accordingly was exempt from destruction. This rea-
soning started in and stayed in the order of life as operation. In that setting, 
what the premises entailed was immortality.21 But in his own half dozen or 
so discussions on the indestructibility of the spiritual soul, written during the 
later periods of his career, Aquinas nowhere makes his reasoning bear on the 
soul's immortality. He seems to limit it strictly, against an Aristotelian back-
ground, to the notion of indestructibility understood in the Peripatetic sense. 
Human beings can think and can will beyond the limits imposed by material 
conditions. This shows that human nature has a factor that is not dependent 
on matter for its existence. Therefore it cannot lose existence through de-
struction of the bodily composite. Yet no capability for acting outside the 
body is thereby shown. Rather, the soul as we know it cannot naturally be 
aware of anything or do any thinking except in terms of material objects. In 
consequence it cannot have any activity apart from the body. It is not a ghost 
in a machine, as satirized by Gilbert Ryle in our own century. The soul 
constitutes but a single agent along with the material side in the body. Ac-
cordingly it is naturally inert without the bodily component. Aristotle himself 
had insisted that soul and body form but a single agent.22 
For Aquinas, then, any existence that the soul would retain after bodily 
death would thereby be naturally one of inactivity. It could not cause in 
Platonic fashion any motion at all, let alone self-motion. It would be dormant 
in much more radical fashion than persons in the Old Testament Sheol, or in 
the Greek Hadys. There would be nothing about it that could be described in 
terms that implied life, such as "survival" or "immortality." "Survival" in its 
etymology means "living on," and "immortality" means perpetual life as 
contrasted with death. "Existence," on the contrary, has "non-existence" as 
its opposite. It need not imply the presence of life. A stone is existent, without 
being alive. You do not say, in any literal sense, that a stone survives a fire 
or that its duration is immortal. Its perpetual existence would not be regarded 
as immortality. However, a human soul's perpetual existence without any life 
at all would perhaps run much more against the grain for today's normal 
thinker than blanket acceptance of annihilation through death. Yet the philo-
sophical possibility of that type of existence for the human soul after death 
throws one back on religious faith in regard to its immortality. One may 
firmly believe in its future life through Christian faith while refusing to claim 
that it can be demonstrated by natural reasoning. At the same time, the 
philosophical demonstration of the divine omnipotence allows for means of 
activity in the separated soul that are entirely beyond our philosophical ken. 
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Against this background one can understand Lord Byng's spontaneous at-
titude of adhering to immortality for the human soul and at the same time of 
being suspicious about philosophical arguments that attempt to demonstrate 
it. At least there is need for care in focusing the question upon the precise 
aspect that can be reached by philosophical reasoning. The rest may then be 
left to religious belief, quite as God may be shown philosophically to be the 
creator of the world without any demonstration of fatherhood. Intimations of 
immortality there well may be, on account of the mind's thinking in terms 
that transcend the material order. But to prove philosophically that the popu-
lar intimations so suggested will in fact be realized, is quite another task. 
There is good reason for being suspicious about the cogency of philosophical 
arguments based upon them. 
By the same token, however, a strong philosophical underpinning for re-
ligious belief in immortality is provided by the cogent demonstration that 
once a spiritual soul has been given existence it can never be separated 
naturally from that existence.23 The spiritual soul is naturally indestructible, 
unlike the sensible things that come under our immediate observation. Argu-
ments based on the material nature of perceptible things do not hold in regard 
to it. Christian philosophy, therefore, can furnish the believer with solid 
defensive or apologetic reasons against the stand that the spiritual soul per-
ishes in death. Further, the positive philosophic study of the spiritual soul's 
characteristic activities becomes deeply attractive and satisfying to one's 
religious propensities. As Aristotle insisted so eloquently in the opening lines 
of his work On the Soul, the study of the soul ranks on the highest level 
among the objects that excite and satisfy our natural craving for knowledgeY 
It furnishes a second welcome instance of a way in which Christian philoso-
phy can satisfy a religious need. 
IV 
A third instance that may be brought forward to illustrate the need for Chris-
tian philosophy regards human destiny. Christian belief places that destiny in 
the beatific vision of God. Human beings, it proclaims, are meant for the 
eternal happiness of heaven. Nothing less can really satisfy the longings of 
the human heart. In the oft-quoted phrase of Augustine this revealed truth has 
been repeated down the centuries: "You have made us for yourself, 0 Lord, 
and our heart is restless till it rests in Thee."2s But to cold human reason this 
outlook presents anomalies. It means that our highest goodness and happiness 
will consist basically in intellectual contemplation. Scripture expresses it as 
"This is eternal life: to know thee alone who art truly God .... "26 
In his Ethics the Greek philosopher Aristotle had concluded on purely 
philosophical grounds that theoretical contemplation is the highest of human 
goods and contains all other goods in one way or another within its scope. 
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This Aristotelian conception has continually given rise to sharp opposition. 
The spontaneous reaction of people is "We don't want to contemplate for all 
eternity, we want to do things." A widely read book on Aristotle written by 
John Herman Randall shortly after the middle of the present century stated 
blandly that if Aristotle were living in modern America he would never have 
placed human felicity in contemplation. He would have located it in action 
and production and progress. A Christian philosophy based on existence is 
not at all bothered by this objection. It can show that things grasped by human 
cognition have three different kinds of existence. As we perceive the things 
in the sensible world we see that first of all they exist in themselves. As we 
reflect upon our own cognition of them, we are aware that they exist also in 
our thought. Their existence in themselves, as real, is seen to have an epis-
temological priority comparable to that of fact over fiction, of truth over 
phantasy. Spontaneously we rank the real existence of things as higher than 
their existence in somebody's cognition, and the existence of one hundred 
dollars in one's pocket as above the hopeful existence ofthem in one's dreams 
at a racetrack. A vessel actually battling the waves in a furious storm is 
accorded more reality than that of a painted ship upon a painted ocean. It is 
doing something in itself, the painted ship is not. 
But the things also exist in the creative essence of God. There they have 
divine existence, and the beatific knowledge of them through contemplation 
of them in the divine essence will be proportionately superior to experience 
of them in their own real existence. Experiencing and living them in the 
splendor of the divine essence will be a better and fuller and more satisfactory 
way of experiencing them. This point is brought home trenchantly when one 
applies to it Aristotle's dictum "The actuality of thought is life."27 Far from 
being the idleness of a painted ship, it is life and activity in the fullest and 
highest degree. It shows on the philosophical level how the beatific vision of 
the divine essence, once it has been accepted as a supernaturally revealed 
truth, can satisfy the unlimited aspirations of the human heart throughout the 
infinite duration of eternity. In positive fashion it thereby makes the prospect 
of heaven philosophically attractive. 
v 
These instances of help from Christian philosophy could be multiplied ex-
tensively by going through the numerous tenets of Christian faith one by one. 
But the three just considered should be sufficient to illustrate the different 
ways in which a Christian philosophy may fill important needs. Defensively 
and apologetically Christian philosophy can come to grips with objections 
from ourselves and from others in regard to the truths of Christian revelation. 
The philosophy does not demonstrate any supernatural truths. It will not 
convince anyone who has not already accepted them on religious faith. It 
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does not make converts. It merely uses a philosophical sword to cut off the 
head of a philosophical objection. That is its apologetic function. The better 
your philosophy is, the more effectively will it do the job. Where philosophies 
such as materialism or pantheism lead in a different direction from that of 
Christian philosophy, an understanding of how those philosophies work will 
make manifest the reason why they reach such different conclusions. It will 
show on the philosophical level why a Christian philosophy is immune to 
their attacks.28 No philosophy can force any other philosophy to accept the 
philosophy's own starting points. In the genial atmosphere of today's plural-
ism, this is an attitude that has every right to claim universal acceptance. 
That is the apologetic side. But positively, Christian philosophy will bring 
out the marvelous intellectual appeal of Christian belief and life that is 
grounded by the revealed truths. From this angle, Christian philosophy should 
surely rank with poetry, music, painting and architecture in enhancing the 
impression of the Christian message upon the human mind. There is accord-
ingly a corresponding need for the philosophy, working in its own charac-
teristic fashion. The three instances just considered, namely the existence of 
God, the indestructibility of the spiritual soul, and the location of the supreme 
human happiness in contemplation, bring out vividly the way Christian phi-
losophy meets this need.29 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Canada 
NOTES 
1. See Maurice NCdoncelle, ls There a Christian Philosophy?, trans. Illtyd Trethowan 
(New York: Hawthorn Books, 1960), pp. 44-81; 100-14. Norman Kretzmann, "Faith 
Seeks, Understanding Finds: Augustine's Charter for Christian Philosophy," in Christian 
Philosophy, ed. Thomas P. Flint (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 
pp. 1-6. An issue of The Monist, 75:3 (July, 1992) has "Christian Philosophy" as its general 
topic. A discussion of methodology for the topic may be found in Arthur F. Holmes, 
Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Nutley, NJ: Craig Press, 1969). 
2. " ... ein hOlzernes Eisen und ein Misverstiindnis," Martin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in 
die Metaphysik (TIibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), p. 6. 
3. See coverage in Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. 
lahrhunderts. ed. Emerich Coreth et al. (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1987-1988) and Christliche 
Philosophie in Deutschland 1920 bis 1945, ed. Paul Wolff (Regensburg: Josef Habbel, 
1949). The Society of Christian Philosophers, which meets regularly in conjunction with 
other philosophical associations, has as its "main aim: to integrate faith with philoso-
phy"-Marilyn McCord Adams, "Philosophy and the Bible: The Areopagus Speech," 
Faith and Philosophy, 9 (1992). 135. On this topic, cf. infra, n. 29. 
4. See Augustine, Contra Academicos, 3.17.37; 3.18.41; 3.19.42. 
5. Cf.: "Et tenent philosophi perfectionem naturae, et negant perfectionem supernatu-
THE NEED FOR CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 181 
ralem; theologi vero cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem gratiae et perfectionem 
supernaturalem." John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Pro!. 1.1.5, in Opera omnia (Ed. Balie' 
Vatican City, 1950), I, 5.15.-17. 
6. Trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960). The original French title 
was Introduction a l'etude de saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1929). 
7. Trans. L. K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956). 
8. New York: Random House, 1955. See also Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1960). 
9. Paris: Vrin, 1960. This key work for understanding Gilson's views on Christian 
philosophy has been only recently translated into English, by Armand Maurer, under the 
title "Christian Philosophy: An Introduction." It is expected to be published shortly. 
10. Bulletin de la Societe franraise de Philosoph ie, 31 (1931), pp. 39; 42; 49-52. 
11. Topics, 1.2.101b2-4. On current hermeneutics as the heirto the Aristotelian tradition 
in this regard, see Richard Bernstein, "Hermeneutics and its Anxieties," Proceedings of 
the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 62 (1988), 65. 
12. See Henricus Denziger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 36th ed. (Barcelona: Herder, 
1976), p. 52, no. 125. 
13. St. Jerome, Epistola ad Magnum, Ep. 70, no. 2; PL, XXII, 666. The simile of using 
Goliath's own sword to cut off the attacker's head was emphasized by Leo XIII in the 
encyclical Aetemi Patris, no. 7; see The Papal Encyclicals, 1878-1903, ed. Claudia Carlen 
(Consortium Books: McGrath Publishing Co., 1981), II, 20a. It was not intended in any 
way to render philosophy self-destructive, for the purpose of the encyclical was to promote 
Christian philosophy. The meaning, rather, is that philosophy is the appropriate weapon 
for cutting off the head of the argument pitted against the faith. The humble pebble and 
sling made the approach possible. 
14. In making this observation, Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, 
2nd ed. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1926), p. 29, notes the fruitlessness of "explicit 
controversy" in philosophical matters. 
15. For a study of this procedure in Aquinas regarding demonstrations of the existence 
of God, see my article "Aquinas and the Five Ways," The Monist, 58 (1974), 16-35. 
16. Aquinas, De potentia, 7.2.ad 9. The text is "Unde patetquod hoc quod dico esse est 
actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum"-ed. P. M. 
Pession, 9th ed. (Turin: Marietti, 1953), p. 192b. Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1.3.4c, 
and Expositio libri peryermenias, 1.5.397-400 (Rome: Comrnissio Leonina, 1989,1*,31). 
On the reasoning from existential actuality, found in sensible things, to the divine exist-
ence, see Barry Miller, From Existence to God (London: Routledge, 1992). 
17. Isaias, 26.12, Knox translation of the Vulgate: "Omnia enim opera nostra operatus 
est Deus." Cf.: "Like flowing water is a king's heart in Jahweh's hand; he directs it 
wherever he pleases." Proverbs, 21.1; The New Jerusalem Bible trans. 
18. See Robert Speaight, Vanier (Toronto: Collins, 1970), p. 124. In somewhat similar 
vein, cf.: "Since all men, therefore, will to be blessed, certainly if they will truly, then they 
also will to be immortal..." Augustine, The Trinity, 13.8.11; trans. Stephen McKenna 
(Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1963), p. 384. 
182 Faith and Philosophy 
19. See Plato, Phaedo, 790-84B; Phaedrus, 248AC; Aristotle, De anima, 3.4.429alO-
b22. Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Props. 15-17; trans. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1933). pp. 17-21. 
20. Plato. Phaedo. 107AB. 
21. Aquinas readily looked upon the Platonic argument from self-motion as meant to 
prove that the soul is immortal as well as subsistent in itself. The reason is that the Platonic 
premises bore directly upon the soul's life. and not just on its existence. In one of his later 
works Aquinas wrote: "Et in idem redit dictum Platonis ponentis animam immortalem et 
per se subsistentem ex eo quod movet seipsam. Large enim accepit motum pro omni 
operatione ...... Quaestiones de anima. I.Resp.; ed. James H. Robb (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), p. 59.2-4. In an earlier work, Aquinas had noted 
how Augustine's proof showed that the intellective soul is immortal on the ground of its 
apprehension of truth, and in a setting largely Platonic: ..... et ex hoc procedit probatio 
Augustini ... et ita probatur quod anima intellectiva est immortalis ex eo quod apprehendit 
veritatem." Aquinas, Scriptum supra libros Sententiarum, 1.19.5.3.ad 3m; ed. P. Mandon-
net, I, 497. 
22. Aristotle, De an., 1.4.408bl-15. The theme is developed against a modern back-
ground in Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), with the 
Cartesian notion of the soul satirized (pp. 15-16) as a "Ghost in the Machine." 
23. Annihilation in the sense of direct and complete withdrawal of existence from a 
thing would not be in accord with the thing's nature, for the tendency of nature is towards 
being. Withdrawal of the divine conservation in being does not pertain to nature. Hence 
there is no natural possibility of annihilation. On this theme. see Aquinas. Quaestiones 
disputatae de potentia. 5.3-4; in the English translation On the Power of God. Dominican 
Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1933. II. 87-104. 
24. Aristotle, De an .• 1.1.402al-4. 
25. Augustine, Confessions, 1.1.1; PL. XXXII. 661.4-6. 
26. In .• 17.3; trans. The New English Bible ('New York': Oxford University Press. 
Cambridge University Press. 1961). p. 183. 
27. Aristotle. Metaphysics, 12.7.I072b26-27. 
28. Current "deconstruction" attacks on philosophies are no exception to this stand. In 
the "deconstruction" approach. the "signs" have been regarded as "magical performatives. 
which. like all magic. know how to hide behind their effects. so that you see only the 
effects. the products." -John D. Caputo. "The Economy of Signs in Husserl and Derrida." 
in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1987). p. 106. In Aristotle's Metaphysics (12.9.1074b35-36). quite differently. human 
cognition is explained as direct awareness of something other than itself. The awareness 
of itself is only concomitant. Thereby the alleged magic is exposed for all to see. 
Awareness of the thing signified is shown to have epistemological priority to awareness 
of the sign. completely defusing this type of attack. The situation holds only for people 
who locate their philosophic starting points in human language and historicity. However. 
that seems to be a majority stand today. 
29. Examples like these three could easily be multiplied. Perhaps especially relevant in 
today's ecumenical atmosphere might be the Aristotelian conception of focal meaning. in 
THE NEED FOR CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 183 
which an identical characteristic is found in its fullness in a primary instance only, yet is 
actually present in other degrees in secondary instances. In point of fact, does not each 
Christian denomination place the fullness of revealed truth in its own tenets, while 
claiming that the other sections of Christianity either add to or subtract from the original 
deposit of revelation? Focal meaning could give a genuinely philosophical explanation of 
how divine truth may be sincerely respected and reverenced in whatever instances it may 
be found. This, of course, is from a strictly philosophical viewpoint, and extends to 
non-Christian religions as well. A copious bibliography of theological writings on this 
ecumenical topic is given by Miika Ruokanen, The Catholic Doctrine of Non-Christian 
Religions according to the Second Vatican Council (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 159-65. 
On this use made of philosophy in developing Christian theology, see papers in The 
Philosophy in Christianity, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989). For the stand that Christian philosophy itself is a "philosophical theology ... broader 
than natural theology" because of the inclusion of doctrinal propositions, see Vesey, p. xi. 
Likewise in the Vesey volume Norman Kretzmann, "Reason in Mystery," pp. 15-16, 
explains Christian philosophy as a "philosophical theology" that admits among its prem-
ises, as philosophical as assumptions, "propositions that are not also initially accessible 
to observation and reason." In this way the medieval epoch was "the golden age of 
philosophical theology" (ibid.). Yet also in this perspective the needs signalized in the 
present paper continue to be operative. One may readily grant that at least in practice the 
medieval theologians incorporated philosophy into theology in quite that way. But on the 
relationship as "too close to be healthy," see William Charlton, Philosophy and Christian 
Belief (London: Sheed & Ward, 1988), p. 8. On the danger latent in "a theologically 
managed philosophy," see Anton Pegis, St. Thomas and Philosophy (Milwaukee: Mar-
quette University Press, 1964), p. 40. 
